Donald Trump, the disruptor.

The president heads to a key economic summit in the heart of Europe to rub elbows with fellow world leaders, financial titans, and the global elite.

After exactly one year in office, a year of breaking norms, snatching and bombing adversaries, pushing peace and threatening allies, what’s the impact of Trump’s global disruption?

Coming up on "Compass Points."

♪ Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Ann Eschenroeder.

Additional support is provided by Friends of the News Hour.

♪ Announcer: This program was made possible by contributions to your PBS station from viewers like you.

Thank you.

Once again, from the David M. Rubenstein Studio at WETA in Washington, moderator Nick Schifrin.

Hello, and welcome to our inaugural "Compass Points."

The global order as we know it is changing rapidly right before our eyes.

There’s a lot going on, and we don’t know how it will all turn out, but the consequences are sure to be profound.

So every week here on "Compass Points", we’ll provide you some direction by turning to the experts who will share an all-encompassing look to help us understand a critical issue and how it affects you at home.

Tonight, it’s President Trump on the world stage.

In a few days, he flies to Davos, his first trip abroad since beheading the Maduro regime in Venezuela and reinforcing his threat to seize Greenland.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has upended US traditional foreign policy.

It has been one of the most consequential foreign policy presidencies, and it is only 12 months in.

Here to help us understand President Trump’s worldview and approach are 3 fantastic guides who I predict will have a lot of PBS polite but substantive disagreements and also reflect the key foreign policy debates in Washington and, crucially, within the administration itself.

Victoria Coates, vicepresident for national security and foreign policy at The Heritage Foundation and the former deputy national security advisor during the first Trump administration.

Kori Schake, senior fellow and director of foreign and defense policy studies for the American Enterprise Institute and a former national security official who worked in the Clinton and both Bush administrations.

And Jennifer Kavanagh, senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

Welcome, all of you.

It is such a pleasure to have all you guys here, especially for our first show.

And we have learned just in the last few days quite a bit about Donald Trump’s worldview.

He, of course, toppled Maduro.

He threatened Greenland just a couple hours later.

And he told The New York Times this, that "There is one thing "that limits my global powers, "my own morality, my own mind.

"It is the only thing that can stop me."

And recently, Deputy Chief of Staff, Stephen Miller, said, "We live in a world, we live in the real world "that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, "that is governed by power."

Victoria Coates, let me start with you.

What do we now understand about President Trump’s worldview?

Coates: Well, Nick, congratulations on the show.

And it’s an honor to be here with you all.

Well, I think you know, what the president was talking about, there is what was demonstrated by the two key actions he took this year.

I would say the B-2 bombing of Iran and then the removal of Nicholas Maduro.

Both of those were similar to what I experienced in the first term with the action against Qasem Soleimani, something our adversaries... Schifrin: Former Quds Force commander.

Commander, the Iranian general.

Something that our adversaries didn’t know we could do, with the kind of precision and expertise that we could.

And so those kinds of very targeted strikes that can change the circumstances on a battlefield are what appealed to President Trump, not getting involved in quagmires and lengthy... lengthy conflicts, but rather changing circumstances and then taking advantage of those changes.

Kori Schake, is that how you define the recent Trump moves, demonstrating to our adversaries something that they didn’t realize the United States could do?

Schake: So I do agree with that point, which is that I think previous administrations have underestimated just how much American power can change dynamics.

They have been fearful of escalation if we aided Ukraine, if we attacked the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

And President Trump has really showed that the US has much... has much more latitude before other countries escalate because we have so much more power.

But what I think the president gets wrong, and it’s really important that he has it wrong, is that no dominant power in history has ever had as much voluntary assistance as the United States has had after 1945.

And we have that voluntary assistance from countries like Denmark, our NATO allies, Australia, Japan, in part because the United States stands for something more than just power, the values that we bring in how we shape the international order, the voluntary restrictions on our own power that we have traditionally practiced.

Those really matter for getting other countries to help us.

And the threats the president has made, not just against Greenland, not just against Venezuela, but against Canada, are diminishing those values and diminishing that voluntary cooperation in ways that are going to make everything else the US tries to do in the world costlier and harder.

Jen Kavanagh, should the US represent more than just US power?

Well, I agree with Stephen Miller’s comments that we live in a world that’s dominated by strength and power.

I think that’s true, and I think it’s always been true.

I think this idea that might hasn’t always made right is a little bit of a fantasy.

And I don’t believe that the United States’ interests are well served by a values-based foreign policy.

I also agree that Trump has been a disruptor, and he has changed the dynamics.

But I don’t think that these big displays of military power are what has really changed the dynamics.

I don’t see the bombing of Iran or the extraction of Maduro as actually changing the dynamics in either of those places in a fundamental way.

I mean, we saw Maduro removed, and his associates are now in power.

What exactly has changed?

I’m not sure.

We actually don’t know that that operation was successful.

We have seen other cases of where leaders have fallen and been removed, and we think that it was a success, right?

Iraq is one.

Libya is another.

And it’s ended up being a huge disaster.

So the story about Venezuela, I think that remains to be told.

My view is that there are other limits on American power, and that is overextension.

One of the big reasons that the United States did not take action in the Middle East this week is because it doesn’t have the assets in the region.

And why not?

Because they’re in Latin America.

So, already, we’re seeing that there are limits to American power.

And those limits will only become more pronounced when we start talking about more serious threats, for example, Russia and China.

Hitting adversaries that can’t hit back isn’t hard, it doesn’t show that we’re powerful.

Victoria Coates, should there be limits on American power?

And Jen Kavanagh is getting to this idea of restraint, which, of course, is one of the main things, one of the main ideas that President Trump ran on back in 2016, at least.

Coates: No, and one of those is geographic.

I mean, we now have 4 theaters we have to pay attention to.

Latin America, for example, was not a major... a major component in the 2017 national security strategy.

It was front and center in the 2025.

And it’s also something we’ve seen at Heritage in our index of military strength.

The one that came out two years ago was the first time we addressed Western Ham as a national security threat, which got strong opposition from a lot of our military folks who said, "No, it’s Europe, Middle East, Indo-Pacific."

That is a new focus.

So now we have 4 theaters we have to pay attention to.

So we are going to have to have more of the partnership from allies and supporters that Kori was talking about, but I would argue, especially after the Hague Summit in April, that is precisely what President Trump is gunning for, is to get partners and allies to increase their capabilities and their ability to act independently, to bolster us.

So let’s go to NATO, let’s go to Europe then, because that’s where the president’s going.

And, of course, a lot of the conversation has been about Greenland, Denmark and Europe lately.

So what... the point that you just made was that the president went to the Hague, went to the NATO summit, and got something that no... none of his predecessors were able to get, 5% commitment of GDP on defense from all 32 nations in NATO.

And yet, at the same time, here we have these threats against Denmark, against Greenland, which has been part of the Kingdom of Denmark since 1721.

That led the Danish prime minister to say any takeover of Greenland could destroy NATO.

But even before that, European trust in the US has been eroding.

So, Kori Schake, explain that.

What has been the impact of this transatlantic tension?

So, the mutual defense pledge that NATO allies make to each other is founded on trust.

And that’s what President Trump’s threats against Greenland, against Canada, that the US wouldn’t honor its Article 5, mutual defense pledge unless allies paid 5%.

It feels like a protection racket more than a mutual defense alliance.

And that really is corroding the trust.

A majority of Europeans consider President Trump an enemy of Europe in recent polling.

That’s actually going to diminish the trust and the sharing of information that matters.

Because of our operations in Venezuela, Britain and the Netherlands are no longer cooperating on drug interdiction in the Caribbean.

Schifrin: In terms of intelligence sharing.

Schake: That is an opportunity cost.

No, in military operations.

Netherlands and the Nordic states are no longer restricting the intelligence on Russia that they share with the United States, because they were finding intelligence they provided us turning up in Russia again.

So, we’re the conduit of intelligence to the Russians, not to our NATO allies.

Those are real costs of the president’s approach to our closest friends in the world.

Coates: No, I would just... I would push back a little bit on that in terms of how we are going to strengthen particularly Europe going forward to take care of issues in Europe.

Because I think if we look at Ukraine, for example, you know, that has been a huge distraction to all of us over the course of now 4 years we’re going to mark in February next month.

So, that is the kind of thing I think the president very much wants partners and allies to do more on, so that we can focus, as I said before, on a more diverse problem set.

Schifrin: But, Jen Kavanagh, do you think that we shouldn’t treat Europe, treat NATO as sacrosanct as we have for the last 80 years?

Well, NATO is not sacrosanct.

It’s an alliance based on interest.

That’s how it should be.

I am sympathetic to the idea that allies need to pay more.

The United States has carried the burden of Europe’s security for decades.

It’s time for Europe to step up and take responsibility for that burden.

I guess I don’t see this as so that the United States can work alongside Europe more effectively.

I see it as a way for the United States to pull back.

It’s not in US interests, in my view, to have so many forces postured forward in Europe.

I don’t see Russia as a major threat to the United States.

I believe that Europe is rich and prosperous and can defend itself.

And so, the United States should be willing to pull back.

And having Europe step up in the interim makes sense.

But the United States should also be ready to pull back even if Europe doesn’t step up.

That said, I think the United States and Europe should have a long and prosperous friendship.

I don’t necessarily agree with the way that the administration has gone about this... this break.

I do see a fundamental split in threat perception between the United States and Europe.

I think that does pose a real challenge to NATO.

But I think there are ways that transatlantic relationship can endure based on economics and other types of factors.

So, I would like to see a more managed transition that allows us to stay friends.

Kori Schake, Russia is not a threat to the United States?

The US should not be deployed on the front lines, so to speak, in Eastern Europe.

I disagree with both of those positions.

Um, that the international order that the US and its allies created out of the ashes of World War II was designed to give us early warning as threats were growing.

And the Russian threat is palpably growing.

And if they succeed in Ukraine, that will destabilize, that will affect the economies of Europe because they will, uh, investment will dry up.

They will have to divert more than 5% to their defense.

Mutual... The mutual defense pledge lets all of us spend less than we would have to spend if we couldn’t rely on each other.

And so, troops in Europe not only help stabilize Europe, which I argue is in American interest, but they are also the launching point for US operations all across the Middle East, North Africa.

And if we don’t treat our allies with respect and honor our pledges, they’re not going to want US bases, they’re not going to give overflight rights, they’re not going to refuel and rearm our forces for things that we need directly.

Playing team sports is actually in American interests.

So, I agree 100% that we should not alienate our European allies, and we definitely should not turn them into enemies.

I don’t think that being able to operate out of bases to project power into the Middle East or into North Africa is the reason I would give for why those friendships remain important, because I would prefer that the United States not project power into the Middle East or North Africa.

I don’t see those regions as having a vital US security interest at stake.

However, there are potential security challenges in the world.

I think, you know, China’s probably the most proximate and the most important, where the United States will need its allies.

And it may not need the allies in military terms, but certainly needs economic cooperation, because China poses such an economic challenge to the United States.

So, I agree 100% that the way the administration has gone about trying to get Europe to step up, so the United States can pull back and focus on other things, has not been productive.

But I am sympathetic to the general direction.

And I guess I’m dissatisfied overall with this idea that, if Europe spends more, we stay, which is sort of the bargain that Trump has struck.

I’m dissatisfied with it because I don’t see any evidence yet that the US is actually pulling back.

Europe spending more doesn’t necessarily burden shift, unless the US pulls back.

Schifrin: Victoria Coates, jump in here and also just remind all of us, why is this important?

This is a really fundamental debate that’s happening, frankly, in Washington and also within the administration.

And so jump in, but also say why this is so important.

Coates: No, it’s critically important.

And to Jennifer’s point, this becomes a math issue.

If you look at the collective GDP that was represented in the Oval Office in that extraordinary meeting, and my compliments to whoever set that up right after the Alaska summit, usually that meeting should have taken 6 months to put together, and they did it in, I think, 70 hours.

But if you look at the collective GDP represented there, it’s close to 50 trillion, is my recollection.

And if you think about the combination of Russia, China, and Iran, if they still have a GDP in Iran, um, that’s closer to 20.

So that math should be dominant.

Now, the Europeans have done some... we’ve done some disastrous things with our spending and deficit problems.

They’ve done some disastrous things with primarily environmentally driven policies.

But it’s all recoverable.

And if we can do that, we then have an economic engine that dwarfs China.

Yes, they’re a challenge to us right now.

It should be a manageable problem.

Russia should be a nuisance.

And so that’s where I think the collective strength between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU can be very, very powerful for us.

Let me switch us to Latin America here and Venezuela.

You know, the real shock this year, of course, has been the president sending the US military in to capture Nicolás Maduro, announcing that the US is, quote, "running Venezuela," but leaving the regime largely intact.

So, Victoria Coates, let me start with you again.

Why capture Maduro, but leave his administration in place?

Coates: My understanding is, is that this is a different approach to leadership changes in a hostile country.

And important to point out that the president gave Maduro almost a year of engagement, of phone calls, of sending emissaries, of trying to get to a better solution.

And the bottom line, I believe, for the administration is that Venezuela was the linchpin for all of the drugs and the cartels that are coming up into the United States, posing a direct threat to the American people, that that’s what got everybody’s attention.

Schifrin: But the fact, if I may, is that actually Venezuela was not necessarily the source of that.

The fentanyl comes from China.

Coates: Well, the precursors do.

But, I mean, they had identified Venezuela as one of the linchpins for that problem, and that Maduro was not changing in any... in any material way.

The president would always rather resolve things by diplomacy, if possible.

And so this became the solution, and they did it... I mean, I remember when Attorney General Barr was working on those indictments against Maduro in 2020.

- This isn’t new.

- Schifrin: Yeah.

And so this is, in many ways, a law enforcement operation, and that rather than break the entire Venezuelan government, that they wanted to use the existing institutions to get to an orderly transition with as much of that intact as possible.

So that is the approach.

I agree we don’t know the story by any stretch of the imagination yet, but that is the rationale.

But, Kori Schake, you know, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, on his third day, declared the opposition of Venezuela, the rightful government of Venezuela.

And here we are, where the president trusts Delcy Rodríguez, the interim leader, Maduro’s handpicked lieutenant.

How do you see this?

And left the interior minister and the defense minister in place.

And they are already, I mean, we’re not running Venezuela, the security services of the Maduro government are running Venezuela.

And the State Department has had to issue a warning that no American is safe in Venezuela.

So we’re clearly not running it.

Moreover, the tactical elegance of the operation to smash and grab President Maduro, or leader Maduro, uh, I don’t see how that adds up to a political objective that this military force is going to achieve.

It’s not regime change, evidently, because we’re keeping the same people in power.

It’s not assisting the democratic transition.

Um, moreover, it’s not at all clear what the president thinks he’s doing.

So the tactical military doesn’t connect up to strategic objectives.

The president hasn’t identified, the story keeps shifting about what we’re actually doing.

And the clock’s ticking.

The regime is reestablishing the terror networks that, uh... that we are allowing to run the country.

That doesn’t seem like a net advantage for American security for me.

Moreover, the president pardoned the convicted president of Honduras, who had been convicted for drug trafficking.

So how do those two things connect?

But what we do know, Jen Cavanaugh, is that the president is seeing a new era of domination over Latin America.

The Donroe Doctrine, right, a Trumpian update to the Monroe Doctrine, early 19th century United States says no European colonialism in the Americas.

Should the US dominate Latin America?

Well, the United States already dominated Latin America before President Trump came in.

I mean, it’s a clear US era of influence.

There was never any major challenge to US Military power in the region.

China had made some economic inroads, but that was mostly because the US companies weren’t interested.

The countries in Latin America were very interested in having US companies come in and invest, but it was the Chinese that invested.

Russians had some activity, nothing major.

So in my view, the United States should be paying more attention to the Western Hemisphere.

I’ve called it like a pivot home instead of a pivot to Asia.

But the threats and challenges that the United States faces in the Western Hemisphere are not military challenges.

They’re drugs and cartels.

These are law enforcement challenges that should be dealt with with law enforcement means.

Or they’re economic challenges which should be dealt with economic means.

Schifrin: Rather than the military.

Rather than military.

So I don’t think that the operation to... uh, to... to, you know, remove Maduro was an appropriate use of military power.

That said, once he’s gone, I would rather see the current regime stay in place because we saw how the other script plays out.

We saw what happens when you remove all of the leadership with the De-Ba’athification in Iraq.

And that was a disaster.

So knowing that that doesn’t work, you know, this is sort of a better alternative once we’re in the place where Maduro is gone.

Let me quick move us to Iran, because these are unprecedented protests.

Many activists believe they were unprecedented threats against the regime.

Middle class, working class, rural urban Iranians coming out in force.

An unprecedented crackdown.

The activists say at least 2,500 have been killed.

Frankly, that would be the deadliest protests in modern Iranian history.

And the number is probably 4 or 5 times that.

Um.

President Trump has wavered.

He initially suggested there might be a military strike.

Seems at this moment while we tape this, perhaps looking for some kind of off-ramp to the tensions.

Victoria Coates, explain to us, why would the president say help is on the way, when it’s not clear that help is on the way?

Coates: Well, for starters, he’s not going to telegraph what he’s actually going to do.

That is a hallmark of how he functions.

And in addition, it’s not entirely clear to me that that is going to be necessary.

You’re absolutely correct.

These are different protests.

They have now entered their third week.

They are much broader than earlier ones, and the regime has been much deadlier.

So all of that is different.

And at the same time, the problems that are motivating the protests are not solvable.

So a lot of this had been building over really the course of the last 10 years in terms of just systemic mismanagement of the Iranian economy and just disastrous, what you might call deferred maintenance on that economy, all coming home to roost at the same time.

And that happened to coincide around the time of the 12-day war and the B-2 bombing, which really exposed the regime as not 100 feet high, omnipotent and inevitable.

And so that’s been building in Iran since then.

They can’t solve these problems.

The banks are starting to fail.

They can’t print their way out of this.

And so that may not require US military intervention.

Schifrin: Kori Schake, you can get the last word.

Just in the small time we have left, that doesn’t require US intervention?

Schake: I think it is morally wrong to encourage protesters to run physical risks when you are not actually going to protect them.

I think the president established a red line that he then is walking away from, and people are going to get killed as a result of it.

I also think the lack of American assistance means that the regime is going to succeed at ruthlessly repressing these protests.

Schifrin: Kori Schake, that’s going to have to be the last word.

Kori Schake, Jen Kavanagh, Victoria Coates, it has been such a pleasure.

Thank you all for being here, especially for our first show.

- Really appreciate it.

Schake: Congratulations.

Thank you very much.

And thank you for watching.

I’m Nick Schifrin.

We hope to see you every week here on "Compass Points".

Announcer: Support for "Compass Points" has been provided by... the Judy and Peter Blum Kovler Foundation, Camilla and George Smith, the Dorney Koppel Foundation, the Gruber Family Foundation, and Cap and Margaret Ann Eschenroeder.

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